

---

**Kenya Country Programme  
2016–2020**

---

**Thematic Programme for  
Governance**

---

**Development Engagement  
Document**

**Peace, Security and Stability**

**(Act, Change, Transform –  
ACT!)**

---

Dev. Engagement Gov.	Outcome	Outputs
Peace, Security and Stability	Improved capacity and effectiveness of CSOs, government and security oversight bodies to counter violent extremism, prevent political and natural resource conflicts in Kenya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The capacity of local level CSOs to address emerging conflicts and forestall violence enhanced.</li> <li>• Increased women engagement in leadership roles in peace and security activities in the engagement areas.</li> <li>• Collaboration between CSOs and government agencies in addressing conflicts and extremism enhanced.</li> </ul>
Budget	Development engagement partner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased use of local information by relevant national and county government agents to develop and implement coherent national security policies, action plans and strategies.</li> </ul>
<p>The Danish contribution is 30 million DKK.</p> <p>USAID also provides support to civil society organizations (CSOs) in the Coastal region through ACT, of approximately 35 million DKK.</p>	Act Change Transform (ACT!) – a registered Kenyan non-governmental organisation (NGO).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthened evidence based research informing policy frameworks and decision making to promote peace and stability.</li> </ul>
<b>Management arrangements</b>		
<p>Denmark will provide funding to the third strategic objective of the ACT! Strategic Plan which is “<i>improved coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts</i>”. ACT has comprehensive experience as grant manager and will convene donor roundtables around their entire strategy whose components are: Environment and natural resources management; Democracy, human rights and governance; Peace-building and conflict transformation and Livelihoods. Denmark and USAID are currently the envisaged donors for the Peace building and conflict transformation thematic area.</p> <p>ACT is managed by an executive Director who reports to a Board of Directors and manages a programme and administration secretariat in Nairobi and Mombasa cities. Field staff is also strategically placed around the country.</p>		
<b>Description</b>		
<p>ACT will continue its primary tasks and as grant manager provide core funding to civil society organizations whose core mandates and strategic plans falls within the objective of this engagement. There will be three engagements areas. The first area and major part of the budget will comprise of a <i>civil society granting and capacity building facility</i> to CSOs that work at county and community level in the area of conflict prevention, peace building and anti-radicalization. ACT will use its existing competitive selection procedure and directly manage the selected civil society organizations based on its experience as grant manager for similar activities. The second area will be the provision of technical assistance (<i>TA</i>) to <i>key government and security oversight agencies</i> such as the Ministry of Interior, the County Policing Authority, the Parliamentary Committee on Security and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission. ACT will use its strategic relationships with these agencies. The third area will focus on <i>research and policy support</i> as well as strengthening the capacity of state crime and security research agencies. The Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS) will receive core funding as a sub-partner of ACT to implement this research support.</p>		

## Contents

---

<b>Contents</b> .....	3
<b>Abbreviations</b> .....	4
1. Introduction .....	1
2. Parties .....	1
3. Documentation .....	1
4. Brief description of the partners .....	1
5. Background and Theory of Change.....	2
6. Development Engagement Objectives.....	9
7. Results Framework.....	10
8. Risk Management .....	12
9. Inputs .....	15
10. Management Arrangements .....	15
11. Financial Management and Audit .....	16
12. Monitoring and Evaluation .....	17
13. Signatures.....	18

## Abbreviations

ACT!	Act Change Transform
AMISOM	African Union Mission In Somalia
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning & Response Mechanism
CHRIPS	Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies
CICC	Coast Inter-Faith Council of Clerics Trust
CIPK	Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya
CPA	County Policing Authority
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
Danida	Danish International Development Assistance
DFID	Department for International Development
DKK	Danish Kroner
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
ISS	Institute of Security Studies
KMYA	Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance
KNAP	Kenya National Action Plan
LICODEP	Likoni Community Development Programme
MERL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting and Learning
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MUHURI	Muslims for Human Rights
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Center
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NPS	National Police Service
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SCORE	Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation
PBO	Public Benefit Organisations
PeaceNet	Peace and Development Network Trust
PET	Police Intelligence Service (Denmark)
PSD	Peace and Security for Development
PSS	Peace, Stability and Security
TA	Technical Assistance
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

# Development Engagement Document: Peace, Security and Stability (Act, Change, Transform)

## 1. Introduction

The present development engagement document details the objectives, expected results, and management arrangements for the development cooperation concerning the support to *Peace, Stability and Security engagement (2016–2020)* as agreed between the parties specified below. The development engagement document is annexed to the *Bilateral Agreement with Act Change Transform (ACT!)* and constitutes an integrated part hereof together with the documentation specified below. The Danish support is provided within the framework of the thematic programme on Governance, one of three thematic programmes under the Danish country programme for Kenya 2015–2020. This engagement document is also available to the External Grant Committee of Danida.

The development engagement entails Danish support of DKK 30 million to the third strategic objective of the ACT! Strategic Plan (2015–2018), which is “*improved coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts*”. The support covers the period January 2016 to June 2020.

## 2. Parties

The Danish Embassy, Nairobi and ACT!

Signatories will be the Danish Ambassador representing the Government of Denmark, and the Executive Director of Act Change Transform (ACT!).

## 3. Documentation

ACT! Strategic Plan 2013–2017 (under revision, a new version for 2015–2018 will be available October 2015).

## 4. Brief description of the partners

***Act Change Transform (ACT!)*** is the engagement partner for the Peace, Security and Stability (PSS) engagement. ACT! is a Kenyan non-governmental organisation (NGO) established in 2001 and has comprehensive experience as grant manager in the area of peace and stability. ACT will as such receive the entire budget for this engagement and distribute core funding to the other sub-partners. This falls within the mission of ACT that is to facilitate the empowerment of marginalised people and communities in Kenya and neighbouring countries, allowing them to become active participants in their own development by enabling them to: articulate themselves as rights holders; demand good governance in the management of resources; and participate in decision-making processes. ACT! does this through grant management, capacity development and by providing advocacy for the benefit of women, youth, people with disabilities and other marginalised groups. ACT!’s main areas of operation are: environment and natural resources management; democracy and human rights and peace building and conflict transformation.

***The Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS)*** is an independent think tank established in 2009 and registered as an NGO that carries out research in the field of security and governance. CHRIPS’s flagship programme is the Security Governance Programme, which seeks to support and promote evidence-based policy change and public discourse on the governance of security.

***Local/County Partners*** working in the field of anti-radicalisation, peace building and conflict prevention will be competitively selected to receive core funding and capacity building using ACT’s

existing procedures. ACT and the Danish Embassy will review applications from local CSOs at the beginning of the engagement and after a Mid Term Review. The criteria for selection of successful applications of local CSO sub partners will be based on technical feasibility (demonstrated knowledge of peacebuilding, conflict and approaches to combat violent extremism and sound analysis of the proposed context), creativity and innovativeness (ability to move beyond traditional peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives), inclusivity (to what extent the intervention substantively includes marginalized and or socially excluded groups such as youth, women, minorities and people with disability - HRBA), M&E Plan (quality of indicators), organizational capacity and experience in peace building and CVE and the sustainability plan, coordination with other donor projects and DANIDA programmes that may have similar principles or in conflict areas. Proposed budgets will be evaluated for reasonableness, cost-effectiveness and value for money. In carrying out the selection process of the local CSOs, ACT will use its existing partner selection procedures as described above. The organisation has worked with an average of 30 partners per programme in the last four years who were selected competitively. In selection of partners for this programme, one of the selection criteria will include assessing their experience in employing the HRBA principles in their work.

## **5. Background and Theory of Change**

### **5.1 Context**

Kenya continues to face peace and security challenges hindering economic development and growth, and disproportionately affecting areas that are already poor and marginalised. The key challenges can be divided into three categories:

#### **(i) Violent extremism (terrorism and radicalisation):**

The global narrative that particular forms of violence stem from radical ideologies (legitimising use of violence for a political course) contributes to the complexity of the nation's security issues. Often, there is fluidity between ideology as a driver of conflict and the quest for economic reward. The Coastal region, the northern frontier and border belts of the country alongside some urban neighbourhoods in Nairobi have developed into hotspots where these issues fester and emanate from. An understanding of these interconnectivities is necessary in finding solutions that will curb violence in these spaces and mitigate the spill-over effect that it portends.

#### **(ii) Conflicts over natural resources including extractives especially in arid and semi arid lands (ASAL).**

Localised confrontations between different ethnic communities or clans over access to water and grassing pastures have often been explained as institutionalised hostilities between neighbours. Influx of arms from conflicts in neighbouring countries has seen communities who feel marginalised from the central state increasingly armed. Recent oil finds in the Northern regions add new dimensions to existing tensions between neighbouring communities and between these communities and the state security apparatus. Government initiated infrastructural development projects like the Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor has provided new prospects for otherwise arid land and hence it has fuelled confrontations over access to and control over land.

#### **(iii) Political conflicts (associated with elections, ethnicity and devolution);**

In 2007 Kenya saw the hitherto worst ethnically motivated clashes as a result of disagreement over the electoral result. However, the underlying drivers that fuelled the conflict were not new, and neither have they been fully addressed since (despite attempts such as the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission and a range of commission reports looking into the conflict). Furthermore, both of the two above mentioned drivers of conflict (terrorism/radicalisation and natural resources) take on a political dimension; either they feed into perceived historical grievances or experiences of

marginalisation, or local access to resources is determined based on ethnic, clan or political affiliation, or finally attacks directly targeting state institutions such as police camps. In addition, Kenya's engagement for peace and stability in Somalia through AMISOM has had a counter-reaction that contributes to all three kinds of conflict dynamics, as does the spill-over effects of conflicts in neighbouring countries such as arms smuggling and refugee flows.

The roots of the conflicts are multiple and often overlapping, and root causes include economic and social inequality and marginalisation, high youth unemployment, unsettled clashes between traditional and modern lifestyles, ethnically divided political landscape, historically highly centralised delivery of government services, inefficient public service delivery, and spill overs from conflicts in neighbouring South Sudan and Somalia.

The Kenyan Constitutional provisions for far reaching devolution to 47 new county governments holds a great potential to end the history of marginalisation by bringing democratic decision power and at least 15% of the national budget to many counties that were earlier deprived of influence and resources. The governance thematic programme will, through many of the other development engagements, seek to empower rights holders at the county level to hold the duty bearers accountable. The system with 47 county governments also holds potential for a more even distribution of political executive powers among Kenya's many different ethnic groups. This can have a positive effect on mitigating post-election violence since it will no longer be one winner taking it all.

However, there are also risks related to devolution, with an even wider space for exploitation and personal gain at the local level. Some actors including politicians are nurturing the level of tension and exploiting ethnic and local conflicts in pursuance of political and economic gain. To make matters worse, there is the easy availability and flow of small arms and light weapons, a very large number of unemployed youth and the presence of organised criminal groups and militia, and the corresponding insufficient presence of police forces. This creates an environment where conflicts can easily escalate into violence, especially around elections where the violence can reach civil war levels.

The constant high levels of violence mainly affect the already poor and marginalised parts of Kenya, including informal settlements in peri-urban areas and the arid and semi-arid areas (ASALs), thus hindering economic development in those regions. On top of this Kenya has experienced and continues to experience terror attacks from al-Shabaab as repercussions from the Kenyan engagement in Somalia through the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The regions affected by terror attacks are mainly bordering Somalia, but Nairobi and Mombasa have also been frequently affected. To counteract these attacks, the security forces have taken a hard approach towards the Muslim community, who mainly live in the regions bordering Somalia and the Coast and in Nairobi's Eastleigh slum area. Together with the recruitment efforts of al Shabaab this is believed to have further fostered radicalisation and violent extremism.

A study by the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) in 2013 found that in addition to ideological reasons, youth unemployment and repressive state counter terrorism initiatives have "pushed" an increasing number of youths to radicalisation in Kenya<sup>1</sup>. An assessment of conflict and violent extremism in the coastal region undertaken by ACT! in 2014 corroborated the ISS findings, and further established that marginalisation, proximity to Somalia and presence of radical Muslim clerics and institutions are also correlated to extremism in the Coast and areas neighbouring Somalia<sup>2</sup>.

Conflicts over natural resources, particularly in the grassing rangelands in the ASALs and less governed hinterlands, have been on the increase particularly in Turkana, West Pokot, Baringo, Samburu and Isiolo counties. These conflicts have evolved to include border/boundary disputes amongst ethnic groups. In addition to grassing resources, the discovery of oil in Turkana has increased hostility

---

<sup>1</sup> Botha, Annel, 2014, *Radicalization in Kenya: Recruitment to Al Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council*, ISS, Pretoria.

<sup>2</sup> ACT!, 2014, *Local Needs and Strategy Assessment: An Assessment of Conflict and Violent Extremism in the coastal region of Kenya*, ACT! and USAID Kenya, Nairobi (unpublished report).

between the Turkana community and the national government and oil exploration companies over compensation for lost land. The Pokot community is also laying claim to the new oil fields, declaring them as their traditional dry season grassing areas, forcing the Turkana County government to the court to compel the national government to accurately determine its boundaries.

The 2013 elections were in general peaceful but there were many contestations at the county levels as rival communities in a few counties violently fought over control and sharing of devolved resources and opportunities such as jobs and local contracts. In 2011 a National Conflict Mapping and Analysis exercise undertaken by the Government forewarned that devolution would heighten the political stakes at the county levels including exacerbating political contestation along ethnic lines<sup>3</sup>. A study on Security and Devolution commissioned by Danida and undertaken in 2014 by CHRIPS, a security research think tank (see section 4) established that devolution may have the potential to alter the balance of power in local units, and raise the stakes in existing conflicts as players may now vie for political power previously beyond their reach<sup>4</sup>. Between March 2014 and July 2014, more than 200 lives were lost in Marsabit, Mandera and Wajir in electoral violence related to control of counties. The next elections scheduled for 2017 may reawaken conflict at the county levels.

Women and girls are especially affected by the violence levels. Kenya has adopted and is implementing the Kenya National Action Plan (KNAP) to domesticate UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security. The KNAP is unique in that it adopts a human security approach addressing social, economic, and political issues around women, peace and security. It recognizes that the root causes of violence in Kenya are based on these political and socio-economic inequalities and not only election violence<sup>5</sup>. The Constitution of Kenya also states that not more than two thirds of either gender should make up elective or appointive bodies and this has been reflected in the National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management where the membership of peace committees at all levels should adhere to the gender rules.

However there are still some bottlenecks to full participation of women in peace processes and the realisation of UN SC Resolution 1325 in Kenya. The Embassy of Denmark in Kenya has engaged in security from a community strengthening perspective through its nine year old Peace and Security for Development (PSD) programme (2006–2015) comprising support to five civil society organizations<sup>6</sup> based in the Coast region. The organizations work in the fields of peace building/conflict resolution, interfaith dialogue, human rights, youth and women empowerment and community policing. The groups work with a diversity of actors including clerics, youth and village elders linking them with political leaders and security administrators. The PSD partner organizations have succeeded in enlisting the support and cooperation of the County Administrations in the Coast Province. This relationship has provided an important opportunity for reaching community members in the areas of project implementation and improved the potential for impact.

The Embassy is also currently supporting the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) in a two year (2013–2015) national cohesion project that promotes ethnic dialogue and incorporates the Directorate of Cohesion in the Ministry of Interior, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission and the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya. Similarly, CHRIPS is currently implementing a one-year pilot project that seeks to deepen the Embassy's security programme and open dialogue with new partners. The components include; technical assistance to the National Task Force on Community Policing in developing the Community Policing Policy and a Crime Prevention Policy; and a pilot

---

<sup>3</sup> GoK, 2011, *National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya*, National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management (NSC), Nairobi.

<sup>4</sup> Mkutu, K., Marani, M. and Ruteere, M. 2014, *Securing the Counties: Options for Security after Devolution in Kenya*, CHRIPS, Nairobi.

<sup>5</sup> Wamai, Njoki, 2013, *UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in Kenya: Dilemmas and Opportunities*, University of Dublin, Dublin.

<sup>6</sup> Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI); Council of Imams and Preachers in Kenya (CIPK), Coat Inter-faith Council of Clerics (CICC); Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA); and Likoni Community Development Programme (LICODEP).

engagement with Mombasa County and Nyeri County in the establishment of a County Security Coordination office and stakeholder engagement on the development of a counter-radicalization policy coordinated by the Office of the President.

## **5.2 Justification including lessons learned**

Considering Kenya's history of violent conflicts and radical extremism, increased peace and stability will be a necessary precondition to reach Kenya's Vision 2030. The current levels of conflicts are inadequate and are hindering economic growth and poverty reduction, especially amongst the poorest. The Peace, Security and Stability engagement seeks to address this by promoting alternative forms of conflict resolution, and by countering violent extremism.

This engagement is based on the lessons learned from the current Danida Peace, Security and Development (PSD) engagement, and an analysis of the needs in the present context. The PSD Programme has helped revitalize the civil society in the Coast Province, bringing together and building the capacity of partner organizations from a diversity of traditions. The combination of faith-based, community development and human rights groups that the PSD network represents has been important in keeping the focus on governance issues across a spectrum of stakeholders.

One key lesson learned from the PSD programme is that a strong partnership within and between civil society and state entities is important to counter violent extremism. The PSS engagement will therefore focus on creating better cooperation between civil society and the security sector. The cooperation in the sector has been especially challenged since the roll out of devolution because the planned cooperation between the devolved County Policing Authorities (CPAs), the devolved County Security Committees<sup>7</sup>, and the National Police Service (NPS) is still weak.

Research by CHRIPS has shown that the county governments can contribute to peace and security in the counties, and that there is a need to support collaboration and sharing of information within County and National government agencies and with local CSOs, as well as to develop and implement measures that enhance operational efficiencies of the police service. There is also a need to continuously study and analyse conflict dynamics in the country and come up with preventive strategies and policies, as well as to improve the capacity for utilising such data for evidence-based decision-making and preventive initiatives.

Lessons from the PSD as well as other Danish funded security initiatives will be taken fully into account to ensure a coherent and well-coordinated Danish engagement. Denmark is through the Stability Fund implementing the "regional stability programme for the Horn of Africa". One component under this programme is the CVE project implemented by the Danish Police Intelligence Service (PET) in collaboration with the Kenyan National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS). The programme has generated important lessons on prevention and identification of vulnerable individuals, and underlines the need for cooperation. It has proposed a design for collaboration between national institutions, Counties and CSO's.

Another part of the thematic programme on governance is the DED on continued support to Human Rights, Access to Justice and Equality. This Engagement will strengthen the Judiciary, a critical organ in the rule of law aspects of security.

Another lesson learned is that there is a need for cooperation in the thematic and geographical scope of peace and security efforts. Many donors are supporting CVE work in the coastal region and Nairobi (refer to Annex 1). But evidence has shown that Isiolo, Garissa, Marsabit, Wajir and Mandera are new recruiting grounds for religious extremists. Natural resources conflicts, particularly centred on extractives in Turkana and Kwale, have not been given the attention they deserve. Conflicts, which are often political, in troubled county borders between Kisumu and Kericho have been festering and so

---

<sup>7</sup> Counties are at different stages of establishing the CPAs.

have the political conflicts in Nakuru, Marsabit, Lamu and Trans Nzoia counties. These gaps in levels of cooperation, in geographic focus, and in the nature of the conflicts being addressed, are where the PSS engagement can play an important role.

ACT! has a strong track record in the field of grant management. It has and continues to manage support and build capacity of local organisations with funding from donors such as USAID<sup>8</sup>, Peace in Eastern and Central Africa phase II<sup>9</sup>, SIDA, and DFID<sup>10</sup>. Currently ACT! is implementing the CVE USAID funded Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE) project in the coastal regions of Kenya. There will be opportunities for sharing and exchange of knowledge and capacity between SCORE and the PSS engagement. ACT! is also the Funds Administrative Unit of the Inter-Governmental Authority in Development Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Network (CEWARN) in Kenya and since 2011 ACT! has supported more than 50 local CSO's to build their capacity and ability to implement peace building activities, focusing on cross-border, natural resources conflicts, post-election violence and countering violent extremism.

Furthermore as there is a lack of coordination and collaboration between initiatives in the peace and security area, the PSS engagement will work with existing initiatives and organisations in Kenya to coordinate, build synergy, enhance collaboration and deepen networks. As already indicated in section 4, other donor activities will be a criterion for country selection. ACT! will especially work closely with the UNDP basket fund project "Deepening Foundations for Peacebuilding and Community Security in Kenya: 2014 – 2018", the DFID supported "Improving Community Security: 2015 – 2017" being implemented by a consortium led by Coffey International and including Saferworld and PeaceNet Kenya and the EU supported "Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism" implemented by the British Defence and Security Think Tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

CHRIPS is uniquely positioned to deliver the TA services in research to the intended recipients as it has expertise, experience and a growing track record in generating policy-relevant knowledge in the areas of human rights, crime and policing as well as terrorism and counter-terrorism. CHRIPS is regularly requested by policy makers (e.g. the Presidency, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Devolution, Parliament) to provide policy advice on questions of security and human rights. CHRIPS also has good contacts and relations with key actors in various security sector institutions and county governments, including the Ministry of Interior in the Office of the President, the Task Force on Community Policing, the National Police Service, the National Police Service Commission, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority, the National Crime Research Centre, and the National Counter-terrorism Centre.

CHRIPS partners include the International Development Research Centre on a three-year project on community security in four East African countries (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda); Institute of Development Studies University of Sussex and CHRIPS are implementing a joint DFID funded project on Local Peace Building and Large Scale Investments with a focus on Turkana; University of Edinburgh and CHRIPS are implementing a DFID funded project on Social Media and Security; the US based National Endowment for Democracy is providing funding to CHRIPS for a project that seeks to promote accountability in the military and intelligence services. Other partners include the Centre for Criminology at the University of Cape Town, and the Department for International Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Through the participation of its members in various platforms, including conferences, seminars and publication in internationally peer-reviewed journals and books, CHRIPS is today increasingly recognized as an important contributor to public debates and discourses of these issues.

---

<sup>8</sup> USD 33 million Kenya Civil Society Strengthening Programme (2008-2013)

<sup>9</sup> USD 12 million (2007-2013)

<sup>10</sup> Changieni Rasilimani Program USD 20 million (2011-2015) funded jointly by SIDA and DFID

Lastly the PSS engagement plays into the Danish Development Policy "the right to a better life" through the human rights based approach by supporting the right to security. Security and peace is furthermore a general precondition the Danish Kenya Country Programme 2016-2020, and has a specific direct impact within the field of greener growth and employment in the marginalised Arid and Semi-Arid Lands

### 5.3 Narrative for Theory of Change

The program's goal is to support Kenya's Vision 2030 through enhanced security, peace building and conflict management. For this change to happen, *a key prerequisite or precondition will be improved capacity and effectiveness of CSOs, government and security oversight bodies to address two persistent conflict drivers in Kenya today.* Violent extremism must be effectively countered and political and natural resource conflicts must be prevented and mitigated. ACT! and its sub-partners, with support from the Embassy of Denmark, will facilitate local CSOs, national and county governments to achieve this outcome through CSO capacity strengthening, technical assistance to government agencies and research on strategic conflict issues.

To achieve this result, a number of key outputs are necessary — these are the building blocks of this engagement. Firstly, the capacity of local level CSOs to identify and engage with emerging conflict issues and forestall violence must be enhanced. Collaboration between CSOs and government agencies in addressing conflicts and extremism must also be improved; this includes better coordination, sharing of security information and building trust. The capacity of relevant national and county government agents to develop and implement coherent national security policies, action plans and strategies is also in need of strengthening, and this will require technical assistance. The pivotal role of women and girls in conflict resolution and countering violent extremism must also be recognized, strengthened and built upon in accordance with the UN Resolution 1325. A much stronger evidence base to inform policy frameworks and decision making in order to promote peace and stability needs to be developed. If these outputs are effectively achieved then this will lead to the outcome, which will in turn help in achieving the goal. A key assumption, however, is that there will be political goodwill by government to engage in new ways in dealing with peace and security issues and that civil society is willing to engage in countering the new security challenges.

There is need for three sets of expertise: (1) organisational strengthening; (2) technical assistance to government on peace and security issues; and (3) research expertise on peace and security. ACT! will utilize its strength in these three areas in close cooperation CHRIPS to build synergies and collaboration between government departments and civil society organizations that will get core support and capacity building for local citizens' engagement in security and peace building. CHRIPS will commission periodic studies and generate learning through its research programme as well as strengthen the capacity of relevant agencies involved in crime and security research.

Previous experience has shown that acceptance by government of CSO led peace and security program may present some challenges. To overcome these challenges, the engagement will support policy advocacy, build stronger relationships between CSOs and government entities and enhance coherence within the government entities in as far as security and peace is concerned. Another key concern is the proposed legislation restricting foreign funding to CSOs. It is however assumed that it will be possible to provide the planned funding as ACT! and CHRISP have good working relations with government institutions. If the government agencies and CSOs work together collaboratively, they will be better placed to prevent, manage and counter extremism, political and resource conflicts and Kenya will be in a better position to achieve Vision 2030.

During programme implementation, women and girls will receive special attention. Research by ACT! (2015) has shown that women and girls can play an important role in CVE because they are the first to notice signs of radicalisation in their relatives. There is currently no safe forum to discuss these early signs of radicalisation and share the information with authorities. In other parts of Kenya female leaders are leading peace building efforts in their communities — women and girls have the potential to

act as key agents of change. The PSS will therefore support the role of women in peace processes and in countering violent extremism.

ACT! will adopt a Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) in the implementation of this DED at both operational and results level. Programmatic interventions will be informed by analysis that identifies the concerns of marginalised groups (women, persons with disabilities and youth) with regard to safety and security. The county and community levels CSOs will be selected through an inclusive process including groups that address specific concerns of marginalised groups. This will ensure consistency with HRBA requirements of participation, inclusion and non-discrimination. The selection process will also assess the capacity of communities (as right holders) to claim their rights with regard to safety and security as well as the capacities of county and national government institutions including the police service (as duty bearers) to fulfil their obligations with regard to community safety and security. This will be in addition to assessing the extent to which the concerns noted in the first UNHRC Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of May 2010 and the second UPR of January 2015<sup>11</sup> have been addressed. Monitoring data will be disaggregated by gender.

The activities, projects and programmes to be implemented by ACT! will aim at building capacity of duty bearers to fulfil their obligations with regard to security as set out under the Constitution of Kenya as well as building capacities of communities to demand and monitor delivery of services related to safety and security; this will ensure that HRBA elements of transparency and accountability on part of duty bearers are adhered to. The table here below highlights the HRBA principles and the corresponding result area:

<b>(HRBA) Principle</b>	<b>Result Area to achieve the HRBA Principle</b>
<b>Non Discrimination, inclusion and participation</b>	<p>Increased female engagement in leadership roles in peace and security activities in the project areas</p> <p>Selection of partners will also reinforce principle of non-discrimination and inclusion as ACT! will select groups that represent excluded and marginalised people (women, youth, persons with disabilities)</p>
<b>Transparency</b>	<p>Collaboration between CSOs and government agencies in addressing conflicts and extremism improved</p> <p>Strengthened evidence based research informing policy frameworks and decision making to promote peace and stability (evidence based decision making will ensure that only objective considerations form the basis of making decisions and likelihood of arbitrariness in making decisions is significantly reduced)</p>
<b>Accountability</b>	<p>Collaboration between CSOs and government agencies in addressing conflicts and extremism improved.</p> <p>Accountability will also be reinforced through use of citizen report cards which will be administered on annual basis to determine levels of satisfaction with regard to delivery of services in the peace, security and stability sectors</p>

<sup>11</sup> The key recommendations by Demark to Kenya at the UPR 2015 that are relevant to this DED and which ACT!'s interventions will address include: Counter-Terrorism measures that are in line with international human rights standards and Kenya's constitution;

The DED will be reviewed after two years of implementation to determine whether the strategy (and theory of change) is working. The lessons learnt will be used to improve the engagement and where necessary review the theory of change.

## 6. Development Engagement Objectives

The overall vision for the partnership is to support the Government and people of Kenya in implementing their *Vision 2030* to create ‘a globally competitive and prosperous country with a high quality of life by 2030’.

The thematic governance programme Objective is to contribute to *the implementation of the Constitution, consolidation of an accountable, inclusive and participatory democracy based on increased stability.*

The expected outcome of this Development Engagement is:

Improved capacity and effectiveness of CSOs, government and security oversight bodies to counter violent extremism and prevent political and natural resource conflicts in Kenya<sup>12</sup>.

### Outputs:

The following key outputs will contribute to the realization of the PSS outcome stated above as well as the main objective of the thematic programme for governance.

**Output 1:** The capacity of local level CSOs to address emerging conflicts and forestall violence enhanced<sup>13</sup>.

**Output 2:** Increased women engagement in leadership roles in peace and security activities in the project areas.

**Output 3:** Collaboration between CSOs and government agencies in addressing conflicts and extremism enhanced<sup>14</sup>.

**Output 4:** Increased use of local information by relevant national and county government agents to develop and implement coherent national security policies, action plans and strategies<sup>15</sup>.

**Output 5:** Strengthened evidence based research informing policy frameworks and decision making to promote peace and stability<sup>16</sup>.

---

<sup>12</sup> This engagement seeks to improve the capacity of local CSOs to coordinate their interventions, collaborate with government institutions such as County Assemblies, Executive (Office of the Governor), Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National government, Ministry of Devolution, NCIC, NCTC, National Assembly and the Senate (Joint Security and Administration Committee). This will result to improved effectiveness in responding to peace and conflict threats, collaboration, sharing of security information and better interventions informed by research and technical assistance to state and non-state actors.

<sup>13</sup> The capacity refers to technical competence and institutional soundness to be effective in addressing new emerging conflicts such as extremism, extractives and political conflicts associated with devolution

<sup>14</sup> The collaboration will be at two levels; one – within Local County based civil society and two between CSOs and government agencies (both county and national) involved in peace and security.

<sup>15</sup> Despite of security being a national function, the devolved units (counties) have a great role in addressing the root causes of conflicts. However, there is need to support both levels of governments with TA to enable them review incoherent policies and strategies so that they work seamlessly. The TA support will also strengthen the capacity of oversight bodies such as County Assemblies, County Policing Authorities, National Assembly and Senate to discharge their constitutional mandates effectively.

<sup>16</sup> It is widely recognised that there is a data gap in the area of security in Kenya. This lack of data subsequently affects the quality of decisions made. Evidence-based decision-making is fundamental for the formulation and decision of sound policies. This engagement will support research that will go a long way in influencing security policies, strategies and interventions both at the country and national levels.

## 7. Results Framework

Act Change Transform (ACT!) is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the progress and achievements of the development engagement using a results framework and M&E system as detailed in Section 12 below. This framework will jointly be agreed between ACT! and the Danish Embassy. In addition, the Embassy will use the following results framework with a limited number of outcome and output indicators for the purpose of reporting back to the Danish constituency. Data to inform the reporting will be supplied by ACT! as part of the ordinary monitoring and reporting of the engagement.

The parties have agreed to measure progress and performance by the following key outcome and output indicators. Within the first ½ year of implementation ACT! will establish annual targets for these indicators. Some of the baselines and targets will be determined within the first ½ year of implementation through a baseline survey to be commissioned by ACT! These indicators and targets will also be reviewed at the end of year 2 (mid-term assessment) to establish where revisions will be needed or new indicators and or targets developed altogether. This is informed by the fluidity and the changing nature of conflicts and security issues in the country.

<b>Outcome</b>		Improved capacity and effectiveness of CSOs, government and security oversight bodies to counter violent extremism, prevent political and natural resource conflicts in Kenya	
Outcome indicator 1		Level of CSO effectiveness in addressing issues of peace, stability and countering violence in relation to extremism, politics and natural resources in the selected counties by 2020.	
Baseline	Year	2015	To be determined by baseline study
Target	Year	2020	80% of CSOs move at least one level
Outcome indicator 2		Rating of effectiveness of government actors at national level and in the selected counties in addressing peace, stability and countering violence in relation to extremism, politics and natural resources by 2020 as measured using citizen's report card (disaggregated by county).	
Baseline	Year	2015	To be determined during baseline
Target	Year	2020	At least 5 of the 7 Counties reach the "Good" level
Outcome indicator 3		Rating of collaboration between CSOs, government and security oversight bodies in the selected counties in countering violent extremism, preventing political and natural resource conflicts by 2020 as measured using citizen's report card (disaggregated by county).	
Baseline	Year	2015	To be determined during baseline
Target	Year	2020	At least 4 of the 7 counties reach "Good" level
<b>Output 1</b>		The capacity of local level CSOs to address emerging conflicts and forestall violence enhanced	
Output indicator 1.1		Change in average Score on CSO partner Organizational Capacity Assessment (OCA) as a result of management capacity support through the project	
Baseline	Year	2015	To be determined after baseline OCA for each CSO
Target	Year	2020	3.0
<b>Output 2</b>		Increased women engagement in leadership roles in peace and security activities in the project areas	
Output indicator 2		# of women engaged in leadership roles in peace and security activities as a result of the project	
Baseline	Year	2015	To be determined after CSO engagement in the counties
Target	Year	2020	210
<b>Output 3</b>		Collaboration between CSOs and government agencies in addressing conflicts and extremism enhanced	
Output indicator 3		# of successful peace building initiatives and forums jointly undertaken by local CSOs and government agencies working in a structured way to prevent conflict and	

		violence	
Baseline	Year	2015	0
Target	Year	2020	70 <sup>17</sup>
<b>Output 4</b>		Increased use of local information by relevant national and county government agencies to develop and implement coherent national security policies, action plans and strategies.	
Output indicator 4		# of successful joint dialogue forums (between oversight bodies such as the National Assembly, Senate, County Assemblies, County Policing Authorities, and county administration) discussing and using local security information that is relevant for security matters	
Baseline	Year	2015	0
Target	Year	2020	140 <sup>18</sup>
<b>Output 5</b>		Strengthened evidence based research informing policy frameworks and decision making to promote peace and stability	
Output indicator 5		# of peace and conflict policies papers produced through research and security information from local databases to inform peace and security strategies and practices	
Baseline	Year	2015	0
Target	Year	2020	10 <sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> 2 initiatives per year in each of the 7 targeted counties, for 5 years

<sup>18</sup> 4 dialogues per year per county for 7 counties for 5 years

<sup>19</sup> Two issues per year

## 8. Risk Management

Concerning this engagement, the following key programmatic and institutional risks were identified. The risks are either likely, very likely or not likely and may change over the period of the engagement given the fluidity of violent extremism, political and resource based conflicts.

Programmatic Risks						
Risk Factor	Likelihood	Background to Assessment of Likelihood	Impact	Background to Assessment of Potential Impact	Risk Response	Combined Residual Risk
Reduced political will to engage in new ways of addressing insecurity.	Unlikely	Preventive efforts and engagement with local communities have not been high on the government's agenda the past years. Relationships between local communities and government are poor. No clear strategies in these areas have been produced.	Major	If the government is unwilling to engage in the proposed processes, the impact on the proposed activities is high.	<p><u>Mitigation/reduction:</u>            ACT! will use its various engagements with government agencies to further deepen the partnership between the PSS partners and the respective agencies such as Ministry of Interior and Coordination. ACT! is a member of the National Steering Committee on peace building that is based at office of the President so will use this office to leverage goodwill with the government. The National Assembly Departmental Committee on Administration and National Security will be consulted by the engagement partners regularly. In addition, ACT! will undertake analysis to identify allies in government to support interventions proposed. It will also ensure that interventions are aligned with national and county development priorities (Vision 2030 and County Integrated Development Plans respectively)</p>	Minor

Programmatic Risks						
Risk Factor	Likelihood	Background to Assessment of Likelihood	Impact	Background to Assessment of Potential Impact	Risk Response	Combined Residual Risk
Funding to civil society activities in the areas of security, human safety and peace building and national cohesion might be restricted if PBO Act is amended.	Likely	Some operatives within and outside government have erroneously blamed CSOs for abetting terrorism. CSOs that are focal on human rights issues have also been profiled for allegedly abetting terrorism or aiding the criminal charges against Kenyan leaders at the International Criminal Court, (ICC). Some parliamentarians have proposed that the PBO Act be amended to cut down foreign funding on security, governance and human rights	Major	If the government bows down to pressure from some of the legislators proposing the amendments, then the work of CSOs in these fields will be severely affected hence major impact to the proposed engagement	<u>Mitigation/reduction:</u> A Task Force has been established to receive views on PBO Act amendment where civil society have lobbied and included in the task force. ACT! mobilized members of CSO Reference Group on the PBO Act amendment to develop a Memorandum that was submitted to the task force. Initial views received don't support capping foreign funding to CSOs but rather support more accountability and transparency from CSOs. The draft report (July 2015) of the Task Force does not make explicit reference to capping of funding ACT! will continue supporting engagement with the Task Force on PBO Act review and the National Assembly so that funding to CSO is not capped	Major
The current approach to security will stand in the way for finding new solutions and alienate civil society from working with the government	Unlikely	Changing modus operandi in the security organs will take time and require multiple efforts to work together to have the intended effect.	Minor	Building trust and enhancing cohesion between security and community require efforts from both sides. If key constituencies are not being reached out to in the near future, the set back is lightly to be significant for peace and cohesion in Kenya.	<u>Mitigation/reduction:</u> Key mitigation is to work closely with government and community especially at the County level in establishing link and developing options for alternative engagements. Communities and government have an equal responsibility in this.	Minor
County governments might be side-lined in the management of security affairs in the Counties	Likely	The national government has kept on insisting that security is a national function despite of the reality that security is increasingly becoming a shared responsibility between the two levels of governments. On their part, the County Governments have insisted that they must be allowed to be in charge of security in their counties since they are the wearers of the shoes	Major	If the national government continues to side-line the counter governments on security matters, the latter might sabotage the work of the former resulting to unprecedented security challenges. National government will not be considered as a serious partner and as such the impact is relevant in the wider scheme	<u>Mitigation/reduction:</u> The Guidelines of Establishing County Policing Authorities have been gazetted. County governments have started recruiting members of the authorities that will be chaired by the Governors. Some counties have improved relationships with security agencies at the counties through provision of vehicles, fuel and housing. ACT! will undertake analysis to establish counties in which CPAs are not functioning properly; this will form basis for facilitating consensus	Major

Programmatic Risks						
Risk Factor	Likelihood	Background to Assessment of Likelihood	Impact	Background to Assessment of Potential Impact	Risk Response	Combined Residual Risk
		and know where it punches			building sessions so as to clarify roles and agree on way forward <u>Mitigation/reduction:</u> The engagement partners will convene regular learning forums to identify challenges to cooperation as well as identify best practices – and this will be recommended for adoption by other CPAs	

Institutional Risks						
Risk Factor	Likelihood	Background to Assessment of Likelihood	Impact	Background to Assessment of Potential Impact	Risk Response	Residual Risk
Weak internal governance structured within IPs that may lead to misuse of funds by CSOs. I.e fiduciary risk; that funds are not used for the intended purposes; do not achieve value for money; and/or are not properly accounted for	Rare	Some CSOs have weak governance structures. This may affect levels of accountability and transparency that are key to effective management of resources. There is thus slight possibility that funds may be used for ineligible purposes by IPs or frauds could occur.	Major	Would the event occur it would encompass a limited share of the budget, hence in terms of efficiency and value for money impact would be minor. However it implies high reputational consequences (reputational risk) to ACT and the Danish Embassy that may have consequences for the operations, and hamper implementation to an extent that affects achieving the objectives.	<u>Mitigation/reduction:</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Good capacity assessments before deciding to on forward funds to sub-grantees</li> <li>2. Enforcement of compliance procedures</li> <li>3. Regular monitoring and review of governance improvement plans</li> <li>4. Frequent reporting measures, resources to implementing CSOs will be disbursed in instalments against returns for reports</li> <li>5. Adequate awareness on eligibility of costs to be done at pre-award level</li> <li>6. Regular checks and reviews to be done to minimise such an occurrence</li> <li>7. Timely review of reports</li> <li>8. IPs to sign integrity / indemnity undertakings at contracting level</li> </ol>	Minor

## 9. Budget

Thematic Programme Governance	Disbursement budget in DKK					
Engagement Objective: Enhanced Peace, Security and Stability	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
<b>Output 1:</b> The capacity of local level CSOs to address emerging conflicts and forestall violence enhanced	2,25	2,25	2,25	2,25	0,00	<b>13,00</b>
<b>Output 2:</b> Increased women engagement in leadership roles in peace and security activities in the project areas.	0,375	0,375	0,375	0,375	0,00	<b>3,00</b>
<b>Output 3:</b> Collaboration between CSOs and government agencies in addressing conflicts and extremism enhanced	0,375	0,375	0,375	0,375	0,00	<b>3,00</b>
<b>Output 4:</b> Enhanced capacity of relevant national and county government agents to develop and implement coherent national security policies, action plans	1,25	1,25	1,25	1,25	0,00	<b>4,00</b>
<b>Output 5:</b> Strengthened evidence based research informing policy frameworks and decision making to promote peace (TA)	1,00	2,00	2,00	2,00	0,00	<b>7,00</b>
<b>Total Danida PSS</b>	<b>7,50</b>	<b>7,50</b>	<b>7,50</b>	<b>7,50</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>30,00</b>
<b>USAID Support to SCORE</b>	<b>10,94</b>	<b>8,47</b>	<b>5,87</b>	<b>3,20</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>28,50</b>

**Notes:** The support from USAID for Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE) is aligned to the USAID program year. The current funding agreement runs from October 2014 to September 2019. The funds indicated are for years Oct 2015 to September 2019. The total USAID funding is USD 5 million (about DKK 35 million). SCORE has three main outputs: i) strengthened community resilience against conflict and violent extremism; ii) enhanced institutional, functionality and technical capacity of targeted CSOs to address conflict mitigation and CVE in the context of devolution; iii) a fund that can rapidly and effectively respond to incidences of violence, be it from community conflict or violent extremism, established and operationalized.

## 10. Management Arrangements

The overall principles for management of the present development engagement are described in the implementing Partner Agreement to which this Development Engagement Document is annexed.

ACT! (Act Change Transform) will be the main engagement partner, and will as the grant manager receive the entire funding and provide core funding to a number of CSO “sub-partners”. ACT! will provide core funding to CHRIPS as sub-partner responsible for research. In addition, a number of county-based civil society sub-partners will be competitively identified. The county-based partners will receive core funding and capacity building support to improve their delivery to the objective of the DED. The following is a brief description of the roles of the partners.

The daily management of the engagement is undertaken by ACT!, who will be responsible for grant management, capacity building of local CSOs, competitive selection and regular review of local CSOs, monitoring, evaluation and reporting to the Danish Embassy. ACT! will also oversee all the other sub partners in this engagement.

CHRIPS will receive core funding that will enable CHRIPS to carry out its normal work and taking the lead in research output, generating high quality research and information that will inform peace and security policies, strategies and initiatives. It will also benefit the work of local CSOs, government agencies and oversight bodies. CHRIPS will also as part of its core work build the capacity of local CSOs in research and documentation. CHRIPS will receive funds from ACT! and will report to ACT!

ACT! will also be grant manager for providing core funding to a number of local CSO “sub partners” at county level that will be selected during the implementation period through open requests for

proposals. Selecting the sub partners during the implementation period will allow due flexibility to accommodate coming needs and changes in the political landscape.

In managing the grants to sub partners, ACT! will be guided by its operating policies and guidelines which are well documented and include; Finance Procedures Manual, Implementing Partners Procedures Manual, Grants Manual, Human Resources Policy and Procurement Manual. ACT! will ensure that the CSOs receiving Danida funding will have the necessary capacity for financial management.

ACT! will apply the guidelines in the ACT!'s Grants Manual, detailing how the grants to local CSOs will be managed. Requests for applications/proposals will also be developed and shared, in publicly accessible places/medium, for eligible local organizations to submit their proposals (competitive selection of local partners). A panel consisting of ACT!, and where feasible the Danish Embassy, will be constituted to review the received applications.

ACT! will participate in the monitoring and evaluation meetings on the Country Programme organised by the Danish Embassy for all engagement partners.

ACT! will hold regular quarterly coordination meetings with CHRIPS to review progress, lessons learned, challenges and mitigation measures necessary to make the engagement a success. Where necessary and feasible, the Danish Embassy may participate in some of these meetings.

The Embassy will be part of ACT!'s donor roundtable for strategic dialogue amongst ACT!'s partners. ACT! invites all donors to regular roundtable meetings, minimum twice a year where they share progress and discuss strategic priorities or adjustments. Danida would, as a part of the proposed engagement, continue having a seat at this table which also provides an opportunity to continue working with like-minded donors. ACT! will also schedule interactions with the Embassy on a need basis to discuss other technical issues that may relate directly to the Embassy's programme.

Sustainability and Exit Strategy: ACT!'s exit and sustainability of the programme will be achieved through the following (i) Empowerment of CSOs and local communities to organise and participate in county governance processes which will result in creation of social capital (ii) Creation of spaces for engagement between CSOs, local communities, county government and national government (iii) ACT! will periodically convene all its stakeholders to peer review research products from the programme.

## **11. Financial Management and Audit**

Both parties will strive for full alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner rules and procedures.

Accounting and auditing of the Danish funds will include accounting and auditing of the whole organisation and will be undertaken by ACT in accordance with the General Guidelines for Accounting and Auditing of Grants channelled through National NGOs (<http://amg.um.dk/en/technical-guidelines/financial-management/accounting-and-auditing> ). ACT will conduct the audit on annual basis and will be required to submit its audit report to the Embassy for the financial years covered by any part of the Danish support.

ACT will maintain accounting records relating to the programme activities in accurate and complete form during implementation and for a minimum of three years after programme completion. Accounting records shall be available for control by the Embassy of Denmark, a representative appointed by the Embassy, or by the Danish Auditor General.

ACT will prepare an annual narrative and financial progress report to be shared with the Embassy within 3 months after each financial year end. In addition to the annual reports, ACT will prepare and submit regular quarterly reports to the Embassy within a month after completion of each quarter.

Funds Disbursement: The Embassy will ensure adequate disbursement to ACT based on the agreed upon annual budgets and workplans. ACT will request funds in two instalments each year with the disbursements based on the progress reported in the expenditure reports and cash expenditure forecasts.

## **12. Monitoring and Evaluation**

ACT! is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the progress and achievements of the development engagement using its own results framework and M&E system. Monitoring and evaluation is crucial for this engagement and in particular there is a need for evidence based programming at all levels. ACT! will be responsible for training and advising all partners on how to establish an evidence base for their activities as well as to monitor their activities on a regular basis. ACT! will be collating all the information each respective organization will be collecting to inform the overall evidence base and progress reporting for the engagement.

The programme has identified a series of performance indicators in the results framework to measure and monitor implementation of the project. Outcome as well as output indicators have been suggested and agreed between the three implementing partners and the RDE. As per ACT!'s MERL framework an M&E plan will be developed for the proposed project where for each indicator, the plan will define the target for the life of the project, level of disaggregation of the data, data source, frequency and schedule of data collection, and the person(s) responsible for data collection. The proposed frequency for tracking and reporting on each indicator is based upon its link to specific activities within the activity and upon the feasibility of data collection. As such, ACT! will report on some indicators quarterly and others annually. ACT! will disaggregate people indicators by gender and age where applicable. There will be a baseline assessment, routine quarterly monitoring visits for each partner, internal mid-term and end- term evaluations. Financial reporting will be on monthly basis.

The local level CSOs will discuss the indicators and tools to be used for collecting data, frequency for data collection and reporting for uniformity of the process of data collection process and reporting. To aid this, standard data collection templates and reporting formats will be provided. Partners will submit reports to ACT! on a quarterly basis for compilation of the quarterly report to the Embassy. There will be quarterly joint reviews between ACT! and all the partners to review progress of the project and refine strategy to enable the project achieve its objectives. Routine data quality audits will be conducted to authenticate data from the field. Success stories will be used to document key best practices.

The Danish Embassy shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the programme. The Danish Embassy will contract a strategic monitoring support for the entire country programme and all DED partners including ACT! will provide data needed to measure progress.

Danida Copenhagen will carry out Real Time Evaluation during the implementation period covered by this agreement and Danida will, also after the termination of the programme support, reserve the right to carry out additional evaluation in accordance with this article.

**13. Signatures**

On behalf of

Act Change Transform

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Executive Director

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

On behalf of

The Danish Embassy, Nairobi

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Ambassador

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date